The Phillips curve framework, which includes the output gap and natural rate hypothesis, plays a central role in the canonical macroeconomic model used in analyses of monetary policy. It is now well understood that real-time data must be used to evaluate historical monetary policy. We believe that it is equally important that macroeconomic models used to evaluate historical monetary policy reflect the framework that policymakers used to formulate that policy. To that end, we use the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) transcripts to examine the role that the Phillips curve framework played in Fed policymaking from 1982 through 2003. The FOMC's transcripts allow us to trace the evolution in policymakers' discussion of the Phillips curve framework over time. Our analysis suggests that the Phillips curve was much less central to the formulation and implementation of US monetary policy than it is in models commonly used to evaluate that policy. Introduction
The economic concept known as the "Phillips curve" celebrated its 50 th birthday in 2008. In 1958, New Zealand economist A.W.H. Phillips (Phillips, 1958 ) documented a negative relationship between unemployment and wage inflation in the United Kingdom over a nearly 100-year period (1861 to 1957) . 1 The Phillips curve concept has been redefined with the advancement of economic thought, and remains important and influential in the canonical macroeconomic model and in most discussions of monetary policy. In the canonical model, the Phillips curve relates some measure of slack in the real economy -the output gap or deviation of unemployment from its natural rate -to present or expected future inflation in some form of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. 2 The Phillips curve is also a key component of most models of a central bank reaction function, which typically rely on some form of a Taylor rule.
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Following the work of Orphanides (2001 Orphanides ( , 2005 and others, it is now well understood that researchers must use real-time data (that is, the data that policymakers actually observed) in order to analyze policy decisions. We believe that it is at least as important -and perhaps even more important -that the model used to analyze monetary policy reflect the framework that policymakers actually relied upon when making such decisions. Given the importance of the Phillips curve in analyses of monetary policy, we investigate the role that the Phillips curve framework played in Federal Reserve 1 Robert King (2008) provides a nice discussion of Phillips' original work and the chronological development of the Phillips curve concept. 2 The seminal contributions of Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1967) led to the distinction between the "short-run" Phillips curve and its "long-run" variant. Because of this work, the standard Phillips curve uses the deviation of unemployment from its estimated natural rate or the deviation of output from its estimated potential level, long-run levels that constrain the performance of the real economy. 3 This need not be independent of the Phillips curve because a positive coefficient on the output gap in a Taylor rule can occur, even if policymakers place no importance on economic stabilization, given the role that the gap in determining inflation via the Phillips curve. To preview our findings, at an abstract level it is clear that most policymakers thought that inflation should be related to the gap between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Nevertheless, the transcripts show wide differences of opinion among policymakers about the usefulness of gap measures -the output gap, NAIRU, or potential output -for explaining or predicting inflation and, consequently, for making monetary policy decisions. Indeed, some FOMC meetings were punctuated by debate about the relevance of the Phillips curve concept, with policymakers dividing into "pro" and "con"
camps. Overall our analysis suggests that the Phillips curve framework appears to have played a much less prominent role in Fed policymaking than it does in macroeconomic models used to evaluate Fed policy. This finding is supported by an investigation of the role that the Phillips curve played in Greenbook inflation forecasts. Our analysis suggests that the contribution of the output gap to Greenbook inflation forecasts declined over the sample period, paralleling a rise in the frequency of discussion about the usefulness Phillips curve framework.
While these forecasts do not necessarily reflect the views of Committee members about the role of the Phillips curve framework in the policymaking process, they constitute a starting point for the policy discussion of the economic and inflation outlook at FOMC meetings. 4 The Greenbook includes a detailed forecast for the US economy and is given to policymakers prior to the FOMC meeting.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 explains how we analyzed the FOMC transcripts and documents the evolution of the discussion of the Phillips curve in FOMC deliberations.
Section 4 presents an empirical analysis of the Federal Reserve Board staff's forecast for inflation. Section 5 concludes.
In a recent paper, Robert King (2008) We too are concerned with inflation expectations; however, the expectations we care about are those of the FOMC and the process through which Committee members arrived at those expectations.
The methodology

3.
How did the FOMC use the Phillips curve in policy decisions?
We have reviewed 22 years of FOMC meeting transcripts in order to catalogue and assess the extent to which policymakers relied on the Phillips-curve framework for determining policy, and staff used that framework for making inflation forecasts. Rather 5 than reading entire transcripts for all 22 years, we employed a search procedure to identify and isolate relevant portions of the text. The search procedure involved scanning each transcript for key words that would be likely to be mentioned in a discussion of the Phillips curve. Once a portion of text was identified, we then read the discussion surrounding the key word. In some cases, the search yielded an isolated comment or question and, in other cases, the search identified a longer discussion (or, less frequently, a presentation) involving the Phillips curve or a gap-based framework for forecasting inflation. Initially, we considered a large number of key words. However, we found that we could reliably identify the relevant discussions by focusing on just four key words:
"potential," "gap," "Phillips," and "NAIRU." In the case of "potential" and "gap," the search procedure yielded many false hits. We subsequently narrowed the selection to those instances that referred to the Phillips curve framework. In addition, the table includes the number of policymaker interventions for each word made during the "policy deliberation" portion of the meeting. The policy deliberation is last substantive item on the formal agenda of each FOMC meeting. Before the policy discussion, the agenda includes procedural issues, discussion of the staff's 6 forecast and economic conditions, and from time-to-time, a special topic.
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Of the more than 1,000 policymaker interventions, fewer than 30 percent occurred when the FOMC was debating its policy options. As we discuss later, starting in 1994
and continuing for several years thereafter, prominent academic economists were appointed to policymaker positions in the Federal Reserve System. With these appointments, the discourse in FOMC deliberations became decidedly more academic in tone, with much more economic jargon and explicit reference to economic models.
Importantly, this parallels the increasing attention paid in the economics literature to monetary policy rules, and John Taylor's (1993) well-known rule in particular.
Interventions during the policy discussion are the most relevant because they reflect the policymaker's view about the role of the Phillip curve framework for determining the stance of monetary policy.
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The early years Not surprisingly, we identified far fewer interventions prior to 1994, although most of them involved the discussion of economic slack, capacity, or operating potential and its implications for inflation. Having defined the methodology we used to extract relevant portions of the transcripts, we now turn to a discussion of our findings. Table 1 shows that references to the Phillips curve framework were relatively rare from 1982 through 1993. There was virtually no mention of NAIRU or "gap." Moreover, very few of the interventions occurred during the deliberation over policy. Discussions of economic prospects and current or future inflation sometimes involved an analysis of the available slack in the economy, the level of operating capacity, or some measure of resource utilization. In most cases, this discussion arose during the pre-policy discussion portion of the meeting and was an exchange between a policymaker and a staff member who was explaining the approach underlying the staff's Greenbook forecast. From these interventions it is clear that the staff was using some sort of output gap measure to project Seger: My second question is one involving a statement in the Greenbook that staff continue to believe that additional pressure in financial markets would be required to slow the expansion, etc. And I guess this goes to Mike: Do you think you've seen the full impact of the tightening moves that we've had to date?
Prell: No, but our thought is that even after we have absorbed those, that we will not open up enough slack, so to speak, or reduce the pressures on the economy enough, to relieve the inflationary pressures. Therefore, we need to hold growth below potential for a period of time. What we have in our forecast is a very slight shortfall of actual growth from potential and very slight easing pressures on resources. And we think that, given the underlying tendencies in the economy, we are going to need a bit more restraint to keep things under control over the last two or three quarters of 1989.
While there was very little explicit reference to the Phillips curve during this period, the few interventions that we found were generally supportive of the Phillips 26). Our reading of Greenspan -throughout the entire sample period -is that he was eclectic with regard to economic models, including (perhaps particularly) the Phillips curve framework. In other words, he used models when they worked but was not wedded to them when they went off track. In what follows, we discuss additional evidence of
Greenspan's "model opportunism" that surfaces in later years of the sample period.
The infrequent use of the Phillips curve framework by policymakers generally, and especially during policy deliberations, suggests that, while the Phillips curve framework was evident in the staff's presentations of their inflation forecasts and many
Committee members believed that inflation was or at least should be influenced by the amount of economic slack in the economy, its role in the formulation of monetary policy 9 appears to have been limited. While the Fed was focusing increasing attention on the funds rate as a policy instrument during this period (Thornton, 2006) , there is no evidence that it was using any measure of the gap to determine its objective for the funds rate in the manner suggested by policy rules that are ubiquitous in modern macroeconomic models.
and beyond
The marked increase in the FOMC discourse on the Phillips curve in 1994
coincided with the appointment of Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen to the Board of Governors. 12 Blinder and Yellen were strong proponents of the Phillips curve framework.
Blinder resigned his position in June 1996 just as Laurence Meyer, another strong proponent of the Phillips curve framework and a forceful advocate of NAIRU, became a
Governor. 13 The role of Blinder, Meyer, and Yellen in policy discussions using the Phillips curve framework is illustrated in By summer, however, the FOMC began to reverse the direction of monetary policy. In addition to slowing demand for US exports coming from Mexico's tequila crisis and its knock-on effects in other emerging market countries, the Greenbook's inflation forecast had begun to veer substantially off track -but not in the direction feared by the FOMC officials who had worried that inflation was on the rise. Instead, actual price and wage growth were lower than expected. Chart 1 shows the evolution of the prediction errors in the Greenbook forecast for core consumer price inflation in the calendar year following the FOMC meeting (computed as actual less projected inflation)
Moreover, the civilian unemployment rate, which dropped to 6 percent in 1994, fell It would say that to achieve a goal for inflation… one would need a specified growth in productivity over the interval to 1998. The staff also would indicate what counterpart reduction in the natural rate of unemployment would occur and provide some idea of the rate of sustained economic growth that would be consistent with reaching the inflation goal without reference to the notion of a Phillips curve tradeoff or sacrifice of output. Then, I and perhaps others could look at that analysis and decide whether it was a reasonable approximation of what was going on in the economy in terms of faster growth in productivity, the result of all of the investments taking place, and faster growth in capacity than allowed for in the staff model. I could decide whether I was willing to base policy on it.
Jordan was a frequent critic of the Phillips curve framework and he was joined by several Boehne: As far as NAIRU is concerned, my personal view is that it is a useful analytical tool for economic research but that it has about zero value in terms of making policy because it bounces around so much that it is very elusive. I would not 18 The Congressional Budget Office's current estimates of the NAIRU show a downward trend throughout this period. 19 FOMC Transcripts, May 1996 , p. 42. 20 FOMC Transcripts, February 1999 , p. 116, and June 1999 want our policy decisions to get tied all that closely to it, especially when most of the NAIRU models have been so far off in recent years.
Poole: I certainly count myself among those who believe that the Phillips curve is an unreliable policy guide. What that means is that the predictive content for the inflation rate -and I'll emphasize the "predictive" -of the estimated employment gap or GDP gap, however you want to put it, seems to be very low.
Furthermore, Poole argued, it was not the gap or NAIRU but inflation expectations that were the key:
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To make it very simple and straightforward, if we look at this in terms of a Phillips curve issue, there is a lot of concentration on growth or on the gap or whether the natural rate of the NAIRU has changed. In fact, I think the expectations component of the Phillips curve is at least as important and that the best way to understand what has happened in the last couple of years is to say that expectations have trumped the gap. The reason that we have been able to run an economy as well as it has unfolded is that there have been firm expectations of continuing low inflation. But expectations will not continue to trump the gap forever. The underlying realities of the pressure on resource markets will gradually take hold; and once we lose the advantage on expectations, I believe it is going to be painful and difficult to get it back.
However, some Board members and Bank Presidents continued to support the Phillips curve framework:
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Parry: … as far as I know, the Phillips curve is still the best model available to forecast inflation and our analysis suggests that the Phillips curve is basically on track.
McDonough: We use the gap between actual and potential GDP as the best tool of inflation forecasting.
Minehan: Some people would debate the validity of this structure. Certainly, if we continue to have accelerating productivity growth, these estimates of output gap and NAIRU and so forth may be wrong. But in a time of uncertainty, it certainly seems that relying on constructs that have helped us bring about nearly 20 years of better economic conditions-milder cyclical turns, ever lower inflation, lower unemployment, and more sustained growth-has validity. It seems appropriate to look back on the things that have helped us create the kind of environment that President McDonough referred to, one in which more people are working, more 21 FOMC Transcripts, May 1999, p. 64. 22 FOMC Transcripts, September 1996 , p. 13, May 1997 , p. 41, and June 1999 14 people have that experience of working, and the benefits of growth are shared more fully by all.
Although most policymakers pitted themselves firmly on one side or the other,
Greenspan remained noncommittal about the Phillips curve:
23 I am merely indicating that there is something quite unusual going on here, and we have been aware of this for a considerable period of time. As I have argued many times in the past and despite the latest set of employment data, employment cannot increase indefinitely at the rate it has been increasing. Leaving the Phillips curve aside, leaving NAIRUs aside, leaving everything aside, I do not know how one can put negative people in an equation and then run it out. At some point, something has to give. We cannot increase productivity merely by an act of will. There are upside limits, so that if effective demand continues to grow as it has, there is no question that inflationary pressures have to emerge. …We cannot keep getting such numbers and continue to say that inflation is about to rise. As we keep projecting a higher rate of inflation, it keeps going down, and there has to be an admission at some point that something different is affecting prices.
What is striking in reading the FOMC transcripts is that, by 1999, there was a clear better than a naïve model). Finally, in the long run, money growth is a more reliable predictor of inflation. Nearly all members agreed that the Phillips curve framework had been problematic in predicting future inflation since the mid-1980s. Some (specifically, Board member Gramlich and Bank Presidents Broaddus and Minehan) thought the poorer performance of the Phillips curve was a result of the Fed's success in reducing and stabilizing inflation -with inflation low and inflation expectations more firmly anchored, there was a less reliable relationship between the output gap and inflation.
Michael Moskow, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, was the only member to endorse the continued usefulness of the Phillips curve, saying "there are limitations to these Phillips curve types of models, but I wouldn't discard them completely. I think there is some benefit to policymaking from these types of approaches." 24 There was general agreement that money growth determines inflation over the long run, but that the monetary aggregates are not useful for conducting shortrun monetary policy. In addition, there was consensus that inflation is determined by a variety of factors, but that there were no viable alternatives to the Phillips curve model.
As President Poole noted, "I think one of the problems here is that, with all the difficulties of the Phillips curve, we need a horse to beat a horse. We need something better but we don't have a framework that is a whole lot better. And the framework that emphasizes money growth… just doesn't do the job that needs to be done over the short horizon."
to move to looking at a wide variety of data and information… A lot of people out there are asking why we can't come up with something simple and straightforward. The Phillips curve is that, as is John Taylor's structure. The only problem with any one of these constructs is that, while each of them may be simple and even helpful, if a model doesn't work and we don't know for quite a while that it doesn't work, it can be the source of a lot of monetary policy error. That has been the case in the past… I hope we can find some stable structure out there. I suspect that we will not.
Skepticism about the usefulness of economic models for policymaking because the economy was undergoing continuous change was an idea that Greenspan brought up from time-to-time in FOMC discussions and is a central theme in Greenspan (2007) .
In this section, we use the output gap from each Greenbook, along with
Greenbook projections for inflation in the current and subsequent calendar year, to assess the extent to which the staff inflation forecasts were consistent with the Phillips curve framework. Given its important role in the canonical macroeconomic model and the lack of a rival framework, it is not surprising to find that Fed staff relied on the Phillips curve framework to explain the Greenbook's inflation forecasts. This occurred even as uncertainty about the size of the output gap and NAIRU increased, and inflation was consistently over-predicted. Greenbook forecasts are a combination of model forecasts and judgment. As Bernanke (2007) has noted, Greenbook inflation forecasts are "… developed through an eclectic process that combines model-based projections, anecdotal and other 'extra-model' information, and professional judgment," and that "most of the models used are based on versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve." Given that the forecasts are a mix of model-based projections and judgment, it is reasonable to assume that the role played by the output gap and NAIRU would have changed over time. Rather
Evaluation of Greenbook inflation forecasts
than estimating a Phillips curve per se, we simply evaluate the extent to which the Greenbook forecasts reflected the Phillips curve framework.
Our empirical analysis is confined to the 132 FOMC meetings from August 1987
through December 2003, a shorter period than we used in our transcript search, owing to the limited availability of the Greenbook's output gap series. 27 We estimated Phillips curves using different measures of inflation, but confine our discussion here to those based upon core inflation as measured by the consumer price index excluding food and energy. 28 Our output gap data consists of Greenbook estimates for the quarter before, the quarter of, and the four quarters following the meeting. 28 When we estimated Phillips curves using other measures of inflation included in the Greenbook -such as overall consumer prices, the fixed-weight price index, and the GDP deflator -the fit of the equation in terms of adjusted was much lower. 29 We also estimated an unemployment-based Phillips curve using the Greenbook forecasts for the annual unemployment rate and real-time NAIRU estimates produced by the Congressional Budget Office (as the NAIRU implicit in the Greenbook is not made public). Due to data limitations of the NAIRU estimates, the unemployment-gap Phillips curve is based upon a shorter sample of 104 meetings. Since the results are qualitatively similar to those for the output-gap Phillips curve, we do not report them here. 30 The Greenbook inflation forecasts and are on a fourth quarter over fourth quarter basis.
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The degree to which the Phillips curve framework is important for the Fed's inflation forecasts is reflected in the estimates of through from equation (1).
Ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters are reported in table 3, along with standard errors and other summary statistics.
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Given the likelihood that the role of the Phillips curve framework changed over the sample period, we estimated equation (1) and the naïve model using a rolling window regression of 50 meetings.
In addition, the table provides estimates when the gap terms are dropped altogether and inflation follows a random walk (a naïve model). The sum of the terms in equation (1) is positive, and a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that this sum is zero at the 1 percent level of significance. Thus, output above potential contributes positively to projected inflation.
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As a final exercise, we estimate the extent to which revisions in the Fed staff's forecasts of core inflation are related to revisions in their gap estimates:
Chart 2 shows the adjusted from the rolling regressions plotted on the end date of the rolling sample. The fit of both models varied considerably in the 1990s with a substantial decline in the explained variation of the inflation forecast for equations estimated over a 50-period sample that ended between late 1995 and the end of 1999, parallel to the time when the FOMC was voicing increasing skepticism about the usefulness of the framework. 31 The standard errors are obtained from heteroskedasticity-consistent covariances using White's procedure. Some thought estimates of the gap were useful for policymaking, while others thought that the relationship between gap measures and current or future inflation was so unreliable as to provide little or no guidance for policy. In addition, the transcripts indicate that, by the late 1990s, attitudes about the usefulness of the Phillips curve framework changed. Even those policymakers who thought that the gap measures were helpful were keenly aware of the difficulty of obtaining reliable real-time estimates of the output gap or NAIRU and, consequently, were more skeptical of their usefulness for policy decisions. Our analysis of the transcripts is generally supported by our empirical examination of the importance of the Phillips curve framework in Greenbook inflation forecasts. Hence, we conclude that the Phillips curve framework appears to have been significantly less important in actual monetary policymaking than is suggested by the canonical macroeconomic model or by widely-used policy reaction functions. Constant terms included but not reported. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. Standard errors obtained from heteroskedasticity-consistent covariances using White's procedure. The change is relative to the Greenbook forecast for the same FOMC meeting in the previous year.
